In this article we analyze a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and two independent retailers. In each order cycle retailers place their orders at the supplier to minimize inventory related expected costs at the end of their respective response times. There are two types of lead-times involved. At the end of the supplier lead-time, retailers are given an opportunity to readjust their initial orders without changing the total order size so that both retailers can improve their expected costs at the end of respective retailer lead-times the time it takes for items to be shipped from the supplier to the retailers. Because of the possibility of cooperation at the end of supplier leadtime, each retailer will consider the other's order-up-to level in making the ordering decision. Under mild conditions we prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the retailer order-up-to levels, and show that they can be obtained by solving a set of newsboy-like equations. We also present computational analysis that provides valuable managerial insight for design and operation of decentralized systems under possibility o f partial cooperation.
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Introduction and Motivation
In this article we investigate a decentralized supply chain of two independent retailers or manufacturers, and a supplier. In the system that we analyze retailers order a common product or raw material from the supplier to ful ll their own random customer demand. We consider a periodic review system where each retailer places an order at regular intervals to raise its inventory position to a predetermined level. The supplier has ample capacity to satisfy the orders placed by the retailers, but there is a xed lead-time supplier lead-time associated with order preparation due to supplier's manufacturing or ordering lead-time, packaging and loading times at the supplier's plant. At the end of the supplier lead time, orders are shipped to retailers. We also assume that there's a xed shipment lead-time associated with each retailer retailer lead-time. When the order is received by a retailer, it is used to satisfy the customer demand and accordingly inventory related holding and backorder costs are incurred.
The environment introduced above ts into two classical manufacturing retailing schemes commonly considered in the literature:
i Consider two independently operated plants manufacturing electronic devices. Both utilizes the same computer chip in their production process, and chips are ordered from an overseas supplier. At the end of supplier lead-time chips are shipped to manufacturers.
ii Consider cross-docking operations in a retail business. Retailers being outlets of the same retailing corporation, but having autonomy in their ordering decisions order the same item from a common supplier. In this case, the supplier lead time consists of the duration of time that the orders are received at the cross-docking warehouse of the retailing corporation, plus the time it takes to load the trucks that are destined to individual retailers.
At the end of the supplier lead-time there is an ideal inventory position for retailers that they would like to attain, which minimizes their inventory related expected costs at the end of their respective response time retailer lead time plus one period. However, as the demand observed during the supplier lead-time is random, their realized inventory positions will be either below o r a b o ve that particular level if demands are assumed to be continuous, being at the ideal level has zero probability. Therefore, a possible transfer of retailer orders at the supplier's plant or at the cross-docking warehouse, before they are shipped to retailers may improve the inventory related costs of the retailers. However, as the supply chain is decentralized, retailers will allow such a transaction only if the transfer yields an improvement for both of them. In Figure 1 we provide an illustration of the system. Our setting ts best for systems where the supplier-retailer chain can not enjoy the full bene ts of centralized decision making, but a room for cooperation still exists, if it improves the performance of both retailers. We detail the extend of cooperation between retailers by referring to the examples given above: i Consider two manufacturing plants in Europe, operating under the same corporation but serving di erent markets. Managers of each plant are evaluated with respect to their own performance. They order computer chips from an Asian supplier and they agree on re-adjusting their original orders at the end of the supplier lead-time provided that it does not deteriorate their own performance. Since the re-adjustment will not a ect the total quantity ordered from the supplier, no costs are associated with such a transaction.
ii Consider two retail stores for an apparel chain, supplied through a common regional cross-docking warehouse. Orders can bere-adjusted at the warehouse just before the trucks are loaded. Again, both stores would agree such a transaction as long as it improves their performances.
As depicted in Figure 1 an order cycle is divided into two subcycles. At the beginning of the order cycle each retailer places an order at the supplier. At the end of the rst subcycle at the end of the supplier lead-time retailers re-assess their stock position, and decide whether a transfer of stock is to take place. Then, they inform the supplier or the cross-docking warehouse of their decision. Since no physical transshipment takes place the transaction occurs either at the suppliers plant o r at the cross-docking warehouse, 3 we assume that the cost of transfer is negligible. Each retailer starts the second subcycle with its new inventory position, and at the end of the order cycle associated costs are incurred.
The main objective of this article is to characterize the optimal order-up-to levels that the retailers base their ordering amounts from the supplier. Since, one retailer's orderup-to level a ects the order placed by the other retailer consider the extreme case, where one retailer places an order of size in nity, and therefore it is always willing to transfer any required amount to the other retailer, the order-up-to levels should befound in a cooperative setting. We assume that the retailers share relevant information such as costs, demand distributions, inventory levels in order to jointly compute optimal orderup-to levels. We also would like to answer several questions pertaining to the behavior of the optimal solution: a what is the degree of improvement in terms of costs and safety stocks gained by cooperation between retailers ?
b which form of cooperation brings the most bene ts cooperation regarding the transfer of stock or using the cooperative solution of the order-up-to levels ?
c How far is the performance of independent cooperative system from the centralized solution?
In this article we make four major contributions: 1 We present and analyze a model of a decentralized supply chain where retailers make their ordering decision by taking into account the possibility o f cooperation, 2 we prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium of retailer order-up-to levels, 3 we i n troduce a key random variable, the net change in the retailer stock position after re-adjustment of retailer orders, and provide its distribution function, which facilitates an explicit characterization of optimal order-up-to level through a newsboy-like equation, 4 we present our computational analysis that provides valuable managerial insight for design and operation of decentralized systems under possibility of partial cooperation. The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related literature. In Section 3 we present the mathematical model and derive the expected cycle costs for the retailers. Our analysis relies on the characterization of a random variable denoting the net change in a retailer's stock position after transfer of stock takes place. In Section 4 we derive distribution function of that random variable, and discuss its various properties. We prove the existence of a unique cooperative solution in Section 5. Computational ndings and discussion of results are presented in Section 6. We present our concluding remarks and discuss extensions in Section 7.
Related Literature
The underlying structure of the system that we investigate is essentially a two-echelon inventory model with transshipment. Such systems are widely studied in the literature when the decision making is centralized. Krishnan and Rao 1965, and Gross 1963 are early examples of models with transshipment. Das 1975 extends the single period model of Gross 1963 to allow transhipments in a certain epoch within the period. Das 1975 argues optimality of Base Stock Conserving BSC transfer rules. Under a BSC transshipment, the excess stock of one location over its base stock level is transshiped to other location if it has a shortage with respect to its base stock level. Tagaras 1989 considers a similar model but restricts transshipmentepoch to the end of a period. Robinson 1999, and Tagaras 1999 extend earlier studies to multi-location environments. Robinson 1999 shows the optimality of a myopic base stock policy for the case of identical retailers. Our basic di erence from these articles is that the locations in our model make their decisions independently, rather than seeking to achieve a joint objective function.
Another related direction of research is the coordination issues of decentralized supply chains. Most of these articles consider incentive schemes between the supplier and the retailers to achieve the centralized solution see, for example, Cachon and Zipkin 1999 , Chen 1999 , Lee and Wang 1999 , Cachon 2001 Game theoretic consumer choice models, as they impose an interaction among retailers, are related to stock transfer model that we investigate. Parlar 1988 considers two substitutable products, where excess demand for an item is directed to other item's stock. Parlar 1988 proves the existence and uniqueness of the Nash solution in a single period setting. Wang and Parlar 1994 extend Parlar 1988 to a three-product case. Avsar and Gursoy 2002 consider a multi-period extension of Parlar 1988 , and show the existence of a myopic Nash solution within the class of stationary policies for the in nite horizon case. In Lipman and McCardle 1997 industry demand for an item is allocated across locations using speci c splitting rules. After the allocation of demand, excess demand is re-allocated in a way similar to Parlar 1988. They characterize the Nash equilibrium of inventory levels and show that it is unique under certain conditions. Mahajan and van Ryzin 2001 analyze a system where consumers choose dynamically from the available products based on a utility maximization criterion. They show that competition among locations leads to overstocking, which in the limit becomes so excess that the individual pro ts of locations approach to zero. We di er from the consumer choice models reviewed above i n t wo important aspects. In the above mentioned articles, excess demand is transferred across locations, whereas we consider the transfer of stock. Also, the transfer of demand from one location to another occurs after the realization of demand with respect to a single order-up-to level computed at the beginning of a single period, whereas in our model we consider the transfer of stock after the occurrence of the supplier lead-time demand, but before the realization of retailer lead-time demand is observed. Therefore, in our analysis the stock position right before the realization of retailer lead-time demand of a retailer is not only a ected by the excess demand in the other retailer, but also a ected by the occurrence of shortage with respect to retailer lead-time order-up-to level.
In a recent article Rudi et al. 2001 consider a two-retailer decentralized model with transshipment of stock. The authors aim to nd transshipment prices for which the joint decentralized pro t achieves the centralized system pro t. Anupindi et al. 2001 employ a general framework with N retailers. Each location makes independent inventory decision how m uch to stock, demands are observed, and then locations jointly determine the shipment decision how to allocate the excess demand. For the inventory decision Anupindi et al. 2001 develop conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They also show that there exists an allocation mechanism for the decentralized system that achieves the centralized solution. Both the motivation and the analysis of our article di er from these papers in the following respects. In our work we model a system di erentiated by possibly long lead times that are observed both prior and after the transfer of stock takes place. Therefore, as well as the determination of the transfer or allocation of stock decision that takes place after the realization of supplier lead-time, and the determination of the inventory decision that precedes the supplier lead-time, we are also interested in the consequences of these decisions in the post-transfer periods through the retailer lead-time. As mentioned in Section 1, a cross-docking distribution system, where the replenishment cycle is decomposed into towarehouse and from-warehouse lead-times provides a good example. In such a case, not only the inventory decision at the beginning of the cycle but also the revised decision at some epoch within the cycle becomes important. The managers of the retailers are interested in the impact of their inventory and transfer decisions with respect to the order-up-to levels computed relative to the retailer shipment times. In our analysis we derive and employ the distribution of net change in the stock position of a retailer as a function of both the original order-up-to levels, and order-up-to levels relative to retailer shipment times. This distribution enables us to analyze important system dynamics with respect to essential system characteristics.
Description of the Mathematical Model
In this Section we present our mathematical model. We choose to describe the details using a single order cycle in order to ease the exposition. Notation and basic de nitions are laid out in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we derive the expected cost function of a retailer. In Section 3.3 we introduce the general periodic review model, and state and discuss the conditions under which the single cycle analysis will hold for the stationary problem. As will be observed in Section 3.3 these conditions are mild.
Preliminaries and Notation
The system is comprised of a supplier and two retailers. Suppose time is divided into periods of unit length. Let L be the length of the supplier lead-time, and l i be the length of the retailer lead-time for retailer i i = 1 ; 2. For the cross-docking example of Section 1, L represents the transportation time of shipping goods from the supplier to the crossdocking warehouse, and l i represents the time it takes to ship goods from the warehouse to the retailer. We de ne D i;t as the demand observed at retailer i in period t, and we let D i k as the generic continuous random variable denoting total demand occurring at retailer i i = 1; 2 over k periods k = 1; 2; : : : . Although we assume that retailer demands are independent through time and across retailers, in Section 4 we argue that this restriction can berelaxed. Let F k i x bethe distribution functions for D i k. We assume that F 1 i x is continuously di erentiable and strictly increasing on the support 7 0; 1 with no mass at x = 0 . Our results would hold for distribution functions over a nite support as well. Let f k i x be the density function of D i k.
At the beginning of a period denote as the rst period for notational convenience retailer i places an order at the supplier to raise its inventory position to level y i , i = 1 ; 2.
When retailers jointly determine order-up-to levels, inventory decision of one retailer depends on the other. Therefore, for a given inventory decision y 2 of retailer 2 , optimal inventory level of retailer 1 is denoted as S 1 y 2 . In order to simplify the notation we suppress the dependency of S 1 and of S 2 on the other retailer's decision, and throughout the article we use S i to denote the optimal value for y i .
For each retailer we focus on a replenishment cycle of length L + l i + 1, as the impact of the inventory decision made at the beginning of the cycle a ects inventory related costs of a retailer at the end of period L + l i + 1 . At the beginning of period L + 1, each retailer has its own ideal inventory position that it would like to achieve to minimize respective holding and backorder costs to be incurred at the end of period L + l i + 1 . Let Z 1 and Z 2 bethese ideal levels for retailer 1 and retailer 2, respectively. We denote the holding and backorder costs associated with retailer i as h i and b i i = 1 ; 2, respectively.
Development of the Expected Cost Functions
We rst derive the ideal stock position, Z i , that retailer i would like to attain at the beginning of period L+ 1 . In order to compute Z i , w e concentrate on demands occurring in periods L + 1 ; L + 2 ; : : : ; L + l i + 1 : simply, Z i is the base stock level for an inventory system where the response time are the periods L + 1 ; L + 2 ; : : : ; L + l i + 1 . Let G i y b e the expected single period cost observed at retailer i, given that the inventory position at the beginning of period L + 1 after any transfer transaction is realized is y:
Since G i y is strictly convex by assumptions imposed on F l i +1 i x, the optimal inventory position for retailer i after any transfer transaction is uniquely given by: 
where x + = maxf0; x g. Note that realizations of A i and B i can not beboth positive.
We de ne random variables 1 and 2 as follows: 1 = amount that can betransferred from retailer 2 to retailer 1 = minfB 1 ; A 2 g 2 = amount that can betransferred from retailer 1 to retailer 2 = minfB 2 ; A 1 g:
We de ne X i as the net change in the stock position of retailer i at the end of period L after any transfer transaction is completed:
We note that 1 and 2 can not be both positive and both X 1 and X 2 are functions of y 1 and y 2 actually, o f 1 and 2 , but Z 1 and Z 2 can be found by equation 2. We de ne C i y 1 ; y 2 as the expected inventory holding and backorder costs of retailer i at the end of period L + l i + 1 :
where the expectation is taken over X i . Since retailer i would like to get as close to its l i +1-period optimal inventory position Z i after any transfer occurs, intuitively, for any given y j j 6 = i, y i that minimizes 4 should be bounded below by Z i . We formalize this observation for retailer 1 in the following proposition the argument for retailer 2 is the same.
Proposition 1 Let S 1 be the minimizer of C 1 y 1 ; y 2 over y 1 for a given value of y 2 . 
Multiple Order Cycles
Although in this article we consider a single replenishment cycle, our development can beused as an approximation for the stationary multi-cycle problem. Let y 1 and y 2 be stationary order-up-to levels for retailer 1 and 2, respectively. Every period the following sequence of events takes place: 1 retailers receive any outstanding orders scheduled to arrive, 2 transfer of stock, if any, is realized at the cross-docking warehouse, 3 retailers place their orders at the supplier, 4 retailer demands are observed and inventory related costs are incurred.
Consider an arbitrary period t. Let I i;t bethe inventory position of retailer i before any transfer of stock between retailers. Note that I i;t includes net inventory at retailer i at time t, outstanding orders from the supplier, and in-transit inventory from the crossdocking warehouse to retailer i. Therefore, I i;t = y i , D i;t,1 . Let i;t be the amount transferred from retailer j j = 1; 2, j 6 = i to retailer i in period t. After 
The second equality follows from equation 8, and the third equality is due to the de nition of D i L. In period t + L the amount that can betransferred from retailer 2 to retailer 1 is given by 1;t+L = minfI 0 2;t+L , Z 1 + ; Z 2 , I 0 1;t+L + g. In order the development in Section 3.2 to be valid, we require two assumptions. First, in order to be able to extend our analysis to multiple order cycles, we should ensure the feasibility of stock transfer. We can also incorporate order cycles of length R 1. Suppose each retailer orders from the supplier using a common order interval of length R. If R L, then our development in Section 3.2 will still be valid for a stationary multiple-order cycle analysis without requiring the second assumption above since in that situation there is only one possible transfer of stock in every order cycle.
Distribution of the Net Change in Inventory Position
As stated by equations 5, 6, and 7, if we can derive the distribution of X i , then the expected cost functions and the optimal policy parameters can be obtained. The following proposition characterizes the distribution function for X i .
Proposition 2 The distribution function of X 1 has the following form: so that H 1 x = R 11 x o n x 1 , and H 1 x = R 12 x, otherwise. Let r 11 x and r 12 x bethe derivatives of R 11 x and R 12 x, respectively r 11 x and r 12 x are well de ned by the assumptions imposed on F 1 1 x.
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Closer inspection of H 1 x reveals that H 1 x is continuous for x 1 and x 1 , but has a jump at x = 1 with probability P 1 1 = R 12 1 , R 11 1
The jump at x = 1 characterizes the mass for which retailer 1 can achieve its best l 1 +1-period order-up-to level Z 1 through transfer of retailer orders at the cross-docking warehouse. We note that the sum P 1 ; 2 = P 1 1 + P 2 2 gives the probability that a transfer of stock occurs between retailer 1 and retailer 2. It can easily beshown that this probability can berewritten as:
If retailers are identical, that is F L 1 1 = F L 2 2 , then the probability that a transfer of stock takes place can not exceed 0.5 in this case P 1 ; 2 is concave and attains its maximum at 0.5.
Limiting cases which will beutilized later for H 1 x can beobtained for 2 ! 1 and for 2 = 0 . 
In the former case, where retailer 2 has ample stock that can betransferred to retailer 1, the stock position of retailer 1 will be greater than Z 1 x 1 only if its demand over supplier lead time is below 1 with probability F L 1 x. On the other hand in the latter case, retailer 2 is willing to receive a n y excess stock from retailer 1. Therefore, retailer 1 can only end up below Z 1 if its own lead-time demand exceeds 1 .
In deriving H i x we assumed that the demands occurring at retailer 1 and 2 are in- there is an opportunity of stock transfer at the cross-docking warehouse, the retailers would determine their initial order-up-to levels y 1 and y 2 jointly by cooperation. Our aim in this section is to show the existence of the unique equilibrium solution.
We can outline major results that we present in this section as follows: By Theorem 1.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole 1996, a Nash equilibrium for retailer 1 and retailer 2 exists whenever i the action space for retailers that is, set of values y 1 ; y 2 is non-empty and compact, ii C i y 1 ; y 2 is continuous in y 1 ; y 2 , and iii C i y 1 ; y 2 is convex in y i for a given y j , j 6 = i. Our rst result in this section establishes the continuity of C i y 1 ; y 2 on a compact subset of R 2 Proposition 3. Then, we show that for a given y j j 6 = i C i y 1 ; y 2 is strictly convex in y i Proposition 4. This proves the existence of a Nash solution. We obtain reaction curves for retailer 1 and retailer 2 as solutions of the following equations in y 1 ; y 2 plane: U 1 y 1 ; y 2 := @C 1 y 1 ; y 2 @y 1 = 0 12 U 2 y 1 ; y 2 := @C 2 y 1 ; y 2 @y 2 = 0 :
13 In Proposition 5 we show that U 1 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 and U 2 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 form decreasing curves in y 1 ; y 2 plane with nite upper and lower bounds. Furthermore, we show that the slope of the curve J 1 y 1 := fy 2 : U 1 y 1 ; y 2 = 0g is less than the slope of the curve J 2 y 1 := fy 2 : U 2 y 1 ; y 2 = 0g for all y 1 , which establishes the uniqueness of the Nash solution.
Proposition 3 C i y 1 ; y 2 is continuous in y 1 ; y 2 on the action space S = Z Since H 1 y 1 , w 1 in 17, y 1 that solves U 1 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 for a given value of y 2 is greater than or equal to Z 1 as proved in Proposition 1. Therefore, whatever inventory decision retailer 2 chooses, the optimal order-up-to level for retailer 1 is bounded from below b y Z 1 . In what follows we state an intuitive result:
Corollary 1 The optimal order-up-to level S 1 y 2 for retailer 1, is decreasing in the inventory decision, y 2 , of retailer 2. Proof: By di erentiating H 1 x with respect to y 2 , we can easily establish from Proposition 2 that H 1 x is increasing in y 2 implying that X 1 is stochastically decreasing in y 2 . The corollary then follows by this property of H 1 x and equation 16.2 By letting 2 = y 2 , Z 2 = 0, we can obtain an upper bound on the optimal orderup-to level for retailer 1. Let H 1 x to assume equation 11 in U 1 y 1 ; Z 2 = 0. Then, the upper bound on S 1 is found by solving: Using Proposition 5 and Theorem 2 we can present an algorithm that converges to S 1 ; S 2 . Let S 0 2 = S 2 Z 1 . De ne S i 1 = S 1 S i 2 and S i+1 2 = S 2 S i 1 for i = 1 ; 2; : : : . Then S i 1 converges from below to S 1 , and S i 2 converges from above to S 2 .
Computational Results
In this section we present and discuss our numerical ndings. Our main focus of inquiry will span:
1. the behavior of the Nash solution with respect to essential system parameters, 2. improvement in terms of costs and safety stocks relative to non-cooperative decentralized solution, 3. improvement relative to decentralized solution with transfer opportunity, 4. system performance relative to completely centralized model.
In our numerical study, the random demand faced by retailer i in a period is normally distributed with mean i and variance 2 i . We set h 1 = h 2 = 1 and use b 1 = b 2 2 f 4; 9; 19g corresponding to service levels f0:8; 0:9; 0:95g, respectively. The mean demand for retailer 1 is xed at 1 = 100, and 2 is set to either 100 or 200. We let cv i = i = i to assume either 0.05 or 0.25, i = 1; 2. The supplier lead-time is set to L = 5, and the retailer lead-time takes either l i = 1 o r l i = 3 for i = 1 ; 2. We used numerical integration procedures of Maple 8 for solving the opimal order-up-to levels and evaluating expected costs.
Through our experiments we computed and recorded the following policy parameters and performance measures: S ind i : order-up-to level for retailer i, given that they place their orders independently. S ind i is found from equation Tables containing all the computational results can be provided by the authors upon request. Main observations drawn from our experiments can besummarized as follows:
1. For the parameter set that we use, we always observed that C i S 1 ; S 2 C ind i and S i S ind i , for i = 1 ; 2. Percent cost improvement gained by employing our model, C i , can be as high as 22 for a retailer. On the other hand, total cost improvement over the independent solution, T C , can be as high as 14. Percent improvement in the safety stocks for a retailer, S S i , can be as high as 33. Similarly, total safety stock improvement can beas high as 17.
2. We observe that as retailers become more symmetric with respect to the standard deviation of demand as 1 gets close to 2 , T C increases. Intuitively, given that one retailer ends up above and the other retailer ends up below its respective Z i value at the end of supplier lead-time, respective excess and shortfall quantities will beclose to each other. Therefore, the likelihood that both of the retailers will get close to their respective Z i values will increase. We observe the same behavior for the safety stock improvements. Our model leads to higher improvements in total safety stocks whenever retailers are more balanced.
On the other hand, highest improvement in the expected cost of a retailer, C i , occurs when retailers are highly unbalanced for example, C 1 = 2 2 :4 and C 2 = 2:4 for 1 = 100, 2 = 200, 1 = 5 , 2 = 50, b 1 = b 2 = 4 , l 1 = l 2 = 1. Moreover, in these cases we observed that the retailer with lower standard deviation of demand gains higher improvement. Similarly, as one would expect, these cases also coincide with the cases where one of the retailers gain high saving in terms of safety stocks for the example above, S S 1 = 33:4, S S 2 = 1:9. The retailer with higher standard deviation of demand is expected to show higher deviation from its Z i value at the end of the supplier lead-time. Consequently, the retailer with lower standard deviation has higher chance of correcting its shortfall or excess by transfer of stock from the former, and hence can retain lower stock levels.
We summarize our conclusions in Table 1 and Table 2 for the case 1 = 100, 2 = 200, and b 1 = b 2 = 4 . In Table 1 , one can observe that highest total percent improvements are obtained for the row corresponding to 1 ; 2 = 5; 10 where 2 = 1 = 2 and lower percent improvements are obtained for the row corresponding to 1 ; 2 = 5; 50 where 2 = 1 = 10. However, as illustrated in Table 2 , the row where 1 ; 2 = 5 ; 50 yields higher percent improvements for retailer 1. 1; 1 1; 3 3; 1 3; 3 5,10 12.4 10.4 10.9 9.1 1 ; 2 5,50 4.2 3.5 3.9 3.1 25,10 11.3 5.9 9.4 8.2 Table 2 As retailer lead-times increase T C decreases. This e ect is expected as in the cases of higher retailer lead-times, the relative length of risk-pooling period, L, o ver the length of the cycle decreases. These observations are illustrated in Table 1 and 2. Notice that both T C and C 1 decrease as we move from l 1 ; l 2 = 1; 1 to l 1 ; l 2 = 1 ; 3 and l 1 ; l 2 = 3 ; 3. Obviously, the supplier lead-time, L also has an e ect on the performance of our policy. In our experiments supplier lead-time is xed as L = 5 . We also computed cases where L = 7, and observed that the performance of our model improves, as expected.
4. We observe a decrease in T C and S Sas unit backorder cost increases. This is due to the fact that an increase in the cost of backordering increases order-up-to levels. Consequently, it becomes more likely for the retailers to end up above their respective Z i values at the end of supplier lead-time, and occurrence of transfer of stock becomes less likely.
5. We compared the performance of our model against the performance of the centralized supply chain. In centralized version of our model, at the end of supplier lead-time the supplier makes an allocation to the retailers. We only considered cases where 1 = 2 and l 1 = l 2 . Essentially, this corresponds to the two-echelon model of Eppen and Schrage 1981 . In Table 3 we present total expected cost of the system for centralized model CM, partial cooperation model that we propose PCM, and decentralized model with no cooperation DM, for cases where 1 = 2 and l 1 = l 2 . It can be observed that, for the cases that we considered, the deviation of the total cost of our model from the centralized solution is no more than 7:4.
This deviation decreases as l i increases, and increases as b increases. Last column of Table 3 illustrates that approximately 70 of the bene ts of complete centralization over complete decentralizaton can be obtained by employing our model. Therefore, a decentralized model operating under the prescribed optimal order-up-to levels and the transfer policy proposed can explain almost 70 of the improvement that would have been obtained by a centralized model. Table 3 6. In Table 4 we present P 1 ; 2 v alues for the parameter sets used in our computations. For the parameter set that we used these probabilities range from 0.395 to 0.492. We observe from Table 4 that the probability of a stock transfer increases as l i increases. Moreover, as b increases for both retailers, order-up-to levels increase, and it becomes more likely for the retailer inventory levels to be above their respective Z i values at the end of supplier lead-time. Therefore P 1 ; 2 decreases. 7. Finally, our computational analysis reveals that most of the system improvement over the completely decentralized model is due to the transfer of stock at the crossdocking warehouse or supplier's plant. In Table 5 is the percent improvement due to joint determination of the stock levels. As can beseen from 
An interesting observation in

Conclusions and Extensions for Further Research
In this article we considered a decentralized supply chain of two independent retailers or manufacturers, and a supplier. In the system that we analyzed retailers order a common product or raw material from the supplier to ful ll their own random customer demand. The supplier has ample capacity to satisfy the orders placed by the retailers, but there is a xed lead-time supplier lead-time associated with order preparation due to supplier's manufacturing or ordering lead-time, packaging and loading times at the supplier's plant. At the end of the supplier lead time, orders are shipped to retailers. Before retailer orders are shipped they are given an opportunity to re-adjust their orders by transferring part of an order quantity from one retailer to the other, as long as this transaction improves expected costs of both retailers. Under this setting we derived unique equilibrium orderup-to levels for the retailers. The derivation is based on a single cycle analysis, but can begeneralized under some mild conditions, as given in Section 3.3.
Our computational results gave us important managerial insights on design and operation of such systems, some of which are summarized as follows: 1 this scheme may lead to considerable bene ts in terms of expected costs and safety stocks, 2 the bene ts may bemuch higher for a retailer with relatively smaller standard deviation of demand, 3 bene ts of cooperation increase whenever the supplier lead-time is long and the retailer lead-time is short, 4 expected total cost of the decentralized system under cooperation does not show a considerable deviation from the centralized system, 5 approximately 70 of the expected cost bene ts of a centralized model can begained from the model that we propose, and 6 around 80 of the cost improvement is due to the transfer of stock at the cross-docking warehouse, and the remaining 20 is attributed to the joint determination of the order-up-to levels Nash improvement. The last point is important, as joint determination of order-up-to levels may be much more di cult than implementing the transfer policy at the cross-docking warehouse.
Our work can be extended in several directions. One possible extension is to consider more than two, say N retailers. Main di culty is in de ning a policy for the transfer of stock at the cross-docking warehouse. A simple transfer rule is to index retailers in a cyclic order in such a w ay that whenever retailer i has an excess, it is used to satisfy the shortage of retailer i + 1mod N. In fact, under such well-de ned transfer rules one can derive the distribution of net change in the stock position, H i x, much like the derivation in Section 4. Another potential extension is to consider xed retailer shipment and transfer costs. The form of the optimal order-up-to levels under xed costs associated with supplier-toretailer shipments, and xed transfer costs is worthwhile to investigate. In our analysis we assumed an uncapacitated supplier. Apparently, if the supply is limited, a rationing game at the supplier, on top of the transfer game that we considered should also be incorporated.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
We condition X 1 on D 1 L: We can obtain the probability distributions for A 2 and B 2 as: 
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove the continuity o f C 1 y 1 ; y 2 . The case for i = 2 is the same. In Proposition 1 we Proof of Proposition 5
Let y 1 2 and y 2 2 be values of y 2 solving U 1 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 and U 2 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 for a given value of y 1 , respectively. Let @y 1 2 =@y 1 and @y 2 2 =@y 1 bederivatives of U 1 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 and U 2 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 at y 1 ; y 2 . We use implicit di erentiation of U 1 y 1 ; y 2 = 0 with respect to y 1 to obtain: 
